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International Institutions
MICHAEL P. ScHARF AND TAMARA A. SHAw*

Achieving global solutions to universal problems based on international rules continues to
be the paramount challenge for international institutions as they seek to work in an entirely
new era of advanced technology and increased interdependence. The year 1998 was a tumultuous
one for international organizations. It was a year in which the United Nations and its affiliated
agencies were pushed to the brink of bankruptcy in the face of U.S. continued nonpayment
ofover a billion dollars inarrears. In 1998, the new world order of Security Council cooperation
stitched together in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf Conflict began to show signs of
fraying inthe context of Iraq's repeated refusal to permit U.N. inspections of suspected chemical
and biological weapons production sites, Serbia's continued massacre of the Albanian people
of Kosovo, and the decision of India and Pakistan to test nuclear weapons. The year was
also one in which the international financial institutions had to scramble to implement novel
approaches in an attempt to head off a rapidly spreading global financial crisis.
I. The U.N.'s Financial Crisis
A. INTRODUCrION

Eleven years ago, when the United States was just 147 million dollars inarrears to the United
Nations, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution that "urges the executive and legislative branches ... to take cooperative action so that payment will be made without delay to the
United Nations, including its specialized agencies, of all amounts assessed to the United States."'
Due to repeated withholdings and nonpayment during the last decade, by the end of 1998, the
United States debt to the U.N. had mushroomed to ten times that amount-over 1.3 billion dollars
(which constitutes more than sixty percent of the debt of all member states).
As a result of the United States' nonpayment, the United Nations currently faces its most
serious financial crisis. According to Joseph E. Connor, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for
*Michael P. Scharf is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy, New
England School of Law; Chairman of the International Institutions Committee of the ABA Section of International
Law and Practice; and formerly Attorney-Adviser for U.N. Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Tamara R.
Shaw is a J.D. Candidate, New England School of Law; B.A., University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

I. Amerian Bar Association Saim of InteuationalLaw and Practice Report to the House of Dlegates, 22 INT'L
LAw. 1261, 1281 (1988).
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Administration and Management, the United Nations is "on the financial brink, lacking both
stability and liquidity." 2 Connor, an American who previously headed the prestigious Price
Waterhouse accounting firm, also revealed that the U.N. will soon be unable to pay its employees
or carry out humanitarian operations, and could be driven to bankruptcy. In November of
1998, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the United Nations was "for all practical
purposes, in a state of bankruptcy. Our doors are kept open only because other countries in
essence provide interest-free loans to cover largely American-created shortfalls." 3
B.

THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO MACE PAYMENTS

In the fall of 1997, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared that the U.N. Charter
"in no way creates a 'legal obligation' on the U.S. Congress to authorize and appropriate"
the money to pay U.N. dues.4 Contrary to this assertion, the United States is in fact under
a binding international legal obligation to pay in full its assessed contributions to the regular
budget and peacekeeping budget of the United Nations. This obligation stems from article 17
of the United Nations Charter. The U.S. freely agreed to pay its assessments when the Senate
ratified the U.N. Charter and made the treaty part of the supreme law of the United States.
At that time, the U.S. joined the other members of the organization in voting to set the U.S.
assessment at twenty-five percent for the U.N.'s general budget and thirty-one percent for the
peacekeeping budget, which reflected the U.S. share of the world economy. Moreover, at the
insistence of the United States, the U.N. annual budgets are adopted by consensus, meaning
the United States can unilaterally block U.N. spending if it chooses! Similarly, the United
States wields control over the U.N.'s peacekeeping budget through the exercise of its veto
power in the Security Council, which must approve all peacekeeping operations. But, according
to the negotiating record of the U.N. Charter, the decision of the International Court ofJustice
in the Certain Expenses case,6 and prevailing state practice (including frequent statements by
the United States), once assessments are adopted under article 17, they are binding.7
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which the United States recognizes as the
authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice), states: "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." 9 Although U.S. courts
have held that a later act of Congress may supersede an earlier treaty obligation when the two
conflict for purposes of domestic law, the treaty obligations neverthdess remain on the international plain, and violations of those obligations continue to be violations of international law.'0
For over thirty-five years, the U.S. Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, had adhered
to a bipartisan consensus that the United States had a legal duty to pay for whatever assessments,
to be used for whatever purpose, the collective membership of the United Nations determines
2. Joseph E. Connor, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, U.N. Department of
Public Information, U.N. Doc. DPI/1815Rev.12 (1998).
3. Thalif'Deen, Poitics-UN.: US. Escape Penalty,Keeps Its Voting Rights, INr'L PREss SERv., Nov. 5, 1998.
BALTImoRE SuN, Mar. 10, 1998, at 9A.
4. Richard N. Gardner, Not Paying U.N. Dept is No Option,
5. Jose E. Alvarez, Legal Remedies and the United Nations' A La Carte Problem, 12 MICH.J.INT'L L. 229
(1991).
6. Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses, 1962 .Cj. 151 (July 20).

7. Richard W. Nelson, Curent Developments:
InrnationalLaw and US. Wiabbolding ofPayments toInternational Organizations, 80 Am.J. L'Nr'L L. 973, 978 (1986).
8. Message from Department of State to U.S. Senate, S. Exac. Doc. L., 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969).
10. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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,are owing, and that it could not unilaterally "pick and choose" among the activities that the
organization decides to communally fund." During the Reagan Administration, however, the
United States first began to fall behind in its payments to the U.N, unilaterally withholding
its share of funds budgeted for what it then considered objectionable organizations and programs.' The Kasenbaum-Solomon amendment and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985
resulted in further reductions in U.S. appropriations to the U.N. Recognizing that these withholdings were not valid under international law, the Bush Administration had adopted a five-year
repayment plan, but in 1994 Congress reneged. 3 During the Clinton Administration (which
also adopted a five-year repayment plan), the situation has grown even worse. In 1998, the
President vetoed House Resolution 1757, which would have provided $819 million dollars
to the United Nations, due to an amendment to the bill that prohibited U.S. funding for
overseas family planning programs.' In November 1998, the United States, threatened with
the loss of its voting rights in the General Assembly as a result of its 1.3 billion dollar arrearage,
narrowly escaped the penalty clause contained in article 19 of the United6 Nations Charter"
by advancing a token sum of $197 million to cover some of its arrears.'
C.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NONPAYMENT

Responding in part to U.S. pressure (and the necessities of getting by with less), in the last
few years the United Nations has significantly cut its staff, streamlined its bureaucracy, reduced
its programs, established an office of Inspector General, and cut out millions of dollars of
redundancy and waste. 7 It has come much doser to becoming the fiscally responsible organization that the United States has demanded. But the U.S. debt has grown so large that it is
seriously disrupting the work of the United Nations, instead of moving it toward further reform.
A fiscally healthy United Nations benefits the United States in many ways. The U.N. provides
a worldwide forum in which the United States elicits support for its policies, interests, and values,
and it establishes worldwide programs that advance those policies, interests, and values. It provides
a means for settling disputes peacefully, providing humanitarian relief, furthering human rights,
and promoting economic and social development. When dispute settlement requires the use of
force, the United Nations provides international legitimacy and support for U.S. actions and sharing of the burden, as has been the case with the Persian Gulf crisis and the conflict in Bosnia. It
is ironic that the United States is damaging the United Nations through nonpayment just when
the United Nations has been best demonstrating its ability to serve U.S. purposes.
For a typical example of how the financial crisis brought on by the United States effects
important U.N. operations, one can look to the experience of the U.N.'s International Criminal

1I. Jose E. Alvarez, The United States Financial Veto, 90 Am. Soc'y

Itr'L L. Phoc. 319 (1996).
12. Id.
13. WASH. Posr WK.Y. RaP., Mar. 18, 1996.
14. Recently, many in Congress have argued that the United States is justified in its withholdings because
it makes billions of dollars in contributions to the United Nations for which it receives no credit or reimbursement.
While such extra-budgetary support has been vital to the success ofU.N. peacekeeping, the U.N. Charter obligates

the United States to appropriate money directly to the United Nations, not just to U.S. agencies to support U.N.
operations.
15. Article 19 provides that "a member of the United Nations which isin arrears in the payment of its financial
contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or
exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years." U.N. CHARTER
art. 19.
16. Deen, supra note 3.

17. Hans Corell, Tbe United Nations in Crisis: Reflctions from Witbin the Secretariat, 90 AM.

Soc'Y INT'L

L.

Phoc. 324 (1996).
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The tribunal was established by the United Nations in
1993 to investigate atrocities committed during the Balkan conflict and bring those responsible
to justice in order to promote reconciliation and lasting peace in the troubled region. In the
summer of 1995, with the U.N. literally running out of cash, it was forced to slow the supply
of funds to the tribunal to a trickle. As a consequence (and despite voluntary contributions
by the United States and others), the office of the prosecutor was prevented from spending
money to send investigators into the field to investigate the massacre of 8,000 civilians at the
U.N. "safe area" of Srebrenica. The office was also precluded from recruiting lawyers and
investigators, or renewing contracts of current personnel, due to restrictions on United Nations
agencies imposed by the Secretary-General in the face of the fiscal crisis. Evidence already
gathered from refugee interviews began to pile up unsifted and untranslated. Consequently,
the work of the tribunal experienced serious delays. In the context of the former Yugoslavia,
justice delayed translated into peace denied."
In addition to crippling the important work of the United Nations, the failure of the United
States to pay its arrears has undercut a variety of U.S. diplomatic efforts-with our negotiating
partners ever more frequently refusing to make concessions to a country which they say has
become the world's biggest "deadbeat" nation. According to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, "the debt undermines our leadership position in the [United Nations], making it
harder for the President or his representatives to bend other members to our will."".. Albright
concluded that the continuing U.S. debt to the U.N. "makes it impossible for us to get what
we want at the U.N."2 This was a theme that emerged repeatedly at the Rome Diplomatic
Conference for a Permanent International Criminal Court in July 1998.
National public opinion polls taken in 1998 demonstrated that the American public recognizes
the important role played by the United Nations, with the percent of the public supporting
the United Nations (seventry-two percent) at its highest point since 1959.2 The public also
recognizes the importance of the U.S. legal obligation to pay its debt to the organization. By
a three-to-one margin, the Americans surveyed favored paying the arrears in full. 2
II. Security Council
The three most significant crises facing the Security Council in 1998 concerned Iraq, Kosovo,
and India/Pakistan. The dissension among members of the Council with respect to these threatening situations suggest that the era of Security Council effectiveness that marked the 1990s may
be coming to a dose.
A.

IRAQ

The enduring struggle to pressure Iraq into compliance with Security Council Resolution
687 continued to be one of the key issues on the Security Council's radar in 1998. At the
conclusion of the Persian Gulf conflict, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (1991),
which imposes on Iraq the terms required for an end to all U.N. actions, including the lifting
BAUCR Jus-ricE: THE STOaY BEHIND THE FrosT INTATrIONAL WAR CRIMEs TAu.
18. MIcHAnl. P. SCHARF,
RG 82 (1997).
Sn'cE NuREMEE
19. US. Sbould Pay Debt to United Nations, PEoRIA J. STAR, Mar. 2, 1998, at A4.
20. Afhtgbt Hopefil US. Will Pay "Embarrasing"UN. Debt This Year, AGENCE FRANCE P.ssE, Jan. 21,
1999.
2 1. Supportfor UN. Saidto be Growingin US., REuaRS, Sept. 17, 1998. The poll of 1,005 adults conducted
between August 21 and 25, 1998, had a margin of error of 3.1%.
22. Id.
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of sanctions.23 To avoid the possibility of a future Iraqi threat using biological or chemical

weapons, 4 resolution 687 requires Iraq to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal
or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of... all chemical and biological weapons
and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development,
support, and manufacturing facilities."" Resolution 687 requires Iraq to divulge the locations,
amounts, and types of its chemical and biological weapons to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. The destruction of these materials is to be performed under the supervision
ofthe United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which ischarged with the responsibility
for inspection and investigation of all known or suspected weapon sites.
After a series of violations of resolution 687 culminating in Iraq's refusal to allow the inspection
teams access to sites designated by UNSCOM,"6 the United States and Great Britain threatened
in February of 1998 to use military force to compel Iraqi compliance.27 The air strike was
averted when, on February 23, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annon signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) inwhich Iraq
agreed to accord "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to UNSCOM.28
The Security Council had hoped that it had resolved the problem of Iraqi production and
stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction 9 in March of 1998, when it unanimously endorsed
the M0U03 negotiated by Secretary-General Annan and Tariq Aziz.3 The body of the MOU
23. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 298 1st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
24. In a letter to the leaders of the House and Senate regarding Iraq, President Clinton stated in relevant part:
Sanctions against Iraq were imposed as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It has been necessary
to sustain them because of Iraq's failure to comply with relevant UNSC resolutions, including
those to ensure Saddam Hussein is not allowed to resume the unrestricted development and
production of weapons of mass destruction.
Clinton Letter to the Leaders of House and Senate, Iraq (visited Oct. 1, 1998) <http://www.usis.usemb.se/
regional/nea/gulfsec/dnt 201 .htm >.
25. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/687 (1991).
26. See Standoffin Iraq: Chronology ofIraqi Violations (visited Oct. 1, 1998) <http://www.foxnews.com.news

packages/iraq/violations.sm >.
27. See PresidentClinton's Addres: Text of Preident Clinton'sAddress to Joint Cbifi of Staff and Pentagon Staff,
Feb. 17, 1998 (visited Oct. 1, 1998) <http://paddle4canoe.ca/CNEWSIraq/clintonaddress.html>.
28. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq on the UN-Accord
on Weapons Inspections, Feb. 24 1998 (visited Oct. 1, 1998) <http://198.80.36.136/current/news/...?/regional/
nea/iraq/iraqitm.shtm > [hereinafter MOU].
29. See S.C. Res. 1154, U.N. Doe S/RES/1154 (1998).
30. MOU, supra note 28. The memorandum provides in relevant part:
The United Nations and the government of Iraq agree that the following special procedures shall
apply to the initial and subsequent entries for the performance of the tasks mandated at the eight
presidential sites in Iraq as defined in the annex to the present Memorandum:
(a) A special group shall be established for this purpose by the Secretary General in consultation
with the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM and the director general of IAEA. This group
shall comprise senior diplomats appointed by the Secretary General and experts drawn
from UNSCOM and IAEA. The group shall be headed by a commissioner appointed by
the Secretary General.
(b) In carrying out its work, the special group shall operate under the established procedures
of UNSCOM and IAEA, and specific detailed procedures, which will be developed given
the special nature of presidential sites, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the
Security Council.
(c) The report of the special group on its activities and findings shall be submitted by the
executive chairman of UNSCOM to the Security Council through the Secretary General.
ld
31. See Ltterfrom the Secretany.Genral Addred to the PrMident of th Security Council (Feb. 25, 1998), U.N.

Doc. S/1998/166 (1998).
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reaffirmed the commitment of all U.N. members to Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence, in return for Iraq's promise to permit unrestricted U.N. inspections
within its territory. 2 The Security
Council stressed that any breach would result in the "most
33
serious [of] consequences."
It did not take long, however, before disagreements over the interpretation of the MOU
arose. Iraq maintained that it had agreed only to an initial visit by U.N. weapons inspectors
and that no subsequent visits were needed because Iraq was in full compliance with resolution
687. 3* Iraq asked for U.N. economic sanctions to be lifted as the price for any further
cooperation."
Iraq was also unhappy about a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom, Sweden,
and Portugal at the end of May to make the Oil-for-Food agreement permanent.3 6 The Oil-forFood agreement was implemented as a modification to the economic sanctions against Iraq
allowing Iraq, under a closely monitored system, to sell a limited amount of oil each year in
exchange for revenue for food. Iraq proclaimed that the Oil-for-Food agreement went into its
final stage on May 30, 1998, and that the draft violated the provisions of the March MOU,
which also indicated that the program would be temporary.37
On August 5, Saddam Hussein unilaterally halted the U.N. weapons inspections when
inspectors attempted to enter the so-called "Presidential Sites." 38 Iraq maintained that it had
destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction and therefore sanctions against the country must
be lifted.39 Iraqi authorities confronted UNSCOM head Richard Butler with their demands
while he was attempting to conduct weapons inspections in Iraq pursuant to resolution 687
and the March MOU. 4 Butler told Iraqi authorities he first needed proof that these weapons
1
no longer existed before he could recommend that the Security Council lift the Iraqi sanctions.
At that point, Iraq announced its decision to terminate its cooperation with UNSCOM.42
The U.N. Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1194 (1998), condemning
Iraq's refusal to cooperate with weapons inspectors. The resolution suspended upcoming sanction
reviews, signaling that there would be no lifting of sanctions.4 3 The next review would have
been set for October, at which time France, Russia, and China were expected to push for a
scaling back of some of the economic sanctions against Iraq."'
With the United States and United Kingdom threatening unilateral action, Iraq consented
to another agreement on November 14 which would allow weapons inspectors into the disputed

32. MOU, supra
note 28.
33. Id.

34. See
Report by the Executive Cbairmn of the Special Commission Establisbedby the SecretarGeneralPursuant
to Paragraph9 (B) (I)
ofSecuriy
CouncilResolution 687(1991), on His Mission to BaghdadJune 11-15, 1998, U.N.
SCOM, Annex, at paras. 11-19, U.N. Doc. S/1998/529 (1998).
35. Id.
36. See excerpts from report by the Iraqi news agency INA, BBC SummARY OF WoRLD BROAD., June 20,
1998, at part 4.
37. Id.
38. See Chronology of Events Leading to US. Attack on Iraq (visited Mar. 9, 1999) < http://www.state.gov/
www/regions/nea >.
39. Id.

40. See August 12tb lemr from the UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butkr on the Implications of Iraq's August
dcisions, U.N. SCOM, U.N. Doc. S/1998/767 (1998) [hereinafter Iraq's August Decisions].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Condennation of Iraq's decision to halt all UNSCOM disarmament work, U.N. Doc. SIRes/1194 (1998).
44. UN. Council Suspenmd Review of Iraq Sanctions, DEursc7HE PRtss-AGNruit, Sept. 9, 1998.
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presidential sites. 4' When Iraq again balked in December, the United States and United Kingdom
launched a massive air strike against Iraq despite opposition from France, China, and Russia."
The United States and the United Kingdom asserted such force was permitted by resolution
678, which authorized member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
"all relevant resolutions" subsequent to resolution 660.4" Thus, they took the position that
they did not need specific Security Council approval for an attack because they were enforcing
resolution 687 per their authority from resolution 678."' Resolution 678 was the "authorizing
instrument for Operation Desert Storm" and has never been rescinded. 4' It authorizes U.N.
member states to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the
area."' 0 Resolution 660 was adopted the day after Iraq invaded Kuwait, and demanded that
Iraq unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait." China, France, and Russia counter that the
Security Council retains authority under resolution 67852 and without explicit authorization
by the Security Council, unilateral military action may not be taken by any member except
when justified as self-defense." Further, China, France, and Russia contend that in light of the
formal cease-fire which is in effect, the meaning of resolution 678's phrase "all necessary
measures" has substantially changed because the assertions of the United States and United
Kingdom, face to face with the current situation, can "no longer reasonably" be said to justify
"an ongoing authority to use force."' 4 Finally, China, France, and Russia take the position
that the "reference of resolution 678 to upholding and implementing 'relevant resolutions'
subsequent to resolution 660" exdudes resolution 687 because the reference was intended to
mean only those "resolutions adopted between the dates of resolutions 660 and 678." 55
B. Kosovo'

6

On January 15, 1999, Serb forces massacred forty-five Albanians in the village of Racak in
southern Kosovo.5 Two days later, the Security Council denounced the incident in a Presidential
Statement but took no further action against Serbia.5 The day after the incident, on January

45. Iraq'sAugust Dwiions, supra note 40.
46. See William Jefferson Clinton, Statement by the President (Dec. 16, 1998) available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File. See also Interview by Jim Lehrer with Thomas Pickering, Under-Secretary for Political
Affairs, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22, 1998).
47. SeeDavid Buchan, Russia and China Head Global Critic,
FiN. Timas (London), Dec. 18, 1998, at 1.The

govemments of several other members of the Security Council, including China, France, and Russia have disputed
that resolution 678 can be used as an ongoing authority to use force. See id
48. See id.

49. See id.
50. See id
51. See id.
52. Seeid
53. See id.
54. See id

55. Seeid.
56. Kosovo is Serbia's southernmost province and is part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

57. See Melissa Eddy, Etbnic Albaians in Kosovo Slaugbtered in Wort MassacreinSeparatistConflict, Bu

wa.o

NEws, Jan. 17, 1999, at 3A. Forty-five ethnic Albanians were killed supposedly inretaliation for the ambush
and murder of four Serb officers. It was reported as quite brutal with some of the victims said to have had their
eyes gouged out or heads smashed in, and at least one man was found decapitated. Id.
58. See U.N. Sec. Council, Presidential Statement, at U.N. Doc. S/PRST/ 1999/2 (1999). Text of Presidential
Statement adopted Jan. 19, 1999.
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16, both U.S. President Clinton" and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright't not only
condemned the acts of violence but specified in their statements to the press that such acts in
violation of agreements with NATO ' will not be tolerated.
62
Albanians are the ethnic natives of Kosovo, making up ninety percent of its population.
Since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, 800 years ago, control of the region has shifted
back and forth between Serbs and Albanians.63 In 1913, the Serbs seized the region and
proclaimed it their fatherland." Serbia began deporting Albanians en masse to Turkey in the
193 0s.65 While the province has experienced continuous cycles of murders, torture, and arrests
of Albanians by Serb secret police, this current crisis has observers fearing that Kosovo will
become another Bosnia.66
Reports of genocide in the former Yugoslavia have resulted in an increasingly assertive role
for NATO, in the face of Security Council paralysis and acquiescence. 67 At the Dayton Peace
Accords, Kosovo activists pleaded to be included within the UN-NATO cooperative peacekeeping missions along with Bosnia and Croatia.68 However, their pleas fell on deaf ears and ' critics
6
contended the "United Nations, under Boutros-Boutros Ghali, [had] failed miserably. " '
Thus, when violence engulfed the province in the fall of 1998, 7o the Security Council
scrambled to adopt a resolution" before the end of NATO's ten day cease-fire deadline." The
initial Serb offensive launched in Kosovo against the ethnic Albanians occurred on September
22, 1998. 73 On the second day of the offensive, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution

59. See Statement by the President On the Massacre of Civilians in Racak, 35 Wu.Y. Comp. PS. Doc. 74
(Jan. 16, 1999).
60. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Press Availability: Kosovo following Volunteer Event at Children's Hospital, Washington, D.C.,Jan. 18, 1999, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department
of State avaiablk at < http:secretary.state.gov/www/statements >.
61. NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was created after World War II to defend against the
perceived worldwide communist offensive. It was formed pursuant to article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
provides the right for the collective self-defense by regional organizations. The most important aspect of the treaty
isarticle 5, which states an armed attack against one or more members of the treaty isan armed attack against
all of them. When fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in 1992, NATO forces entered the region to implement
peace efforts. Later, under the cooperative authority of the U.N., NATO troops conducted air strikes and patrolled
the established no-fly zones over the Balkan region. See The North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, para.
1-2, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
62. See Abdussalam Chouia, Will Kosovo Becamse Another Bosnia?, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1998, at A19.
63. Seid
64. See d
65. See id.
66. Seeid,
67. See World inBrief/Yugoslavia: Despite Denial, Serbs Pres Kosovo Attacks, L.A. TimSs, Sept. 29, 1998, at
A20.
68. See Chouia, supra note 62.
69. See id.
70. See
George Gedda, Witb NATO Poised to Unkasb Air Strikes on Serb Forcesin Kosovo, Some Wonder How
the Crisis Reached This Point, BurFs.o NEws, Oct. 5, 1998, at IA. In May, after the world heard reports of
genocide and torture in Kosovo, Albania made requests for NATO to intervene in the region. Tensions continued
in the region throughout the summer months until full-fledged combat broke out between the Seth forces and
the ethnic Albanians. See id.
71. SeeS.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1203 (1998).
72. SeeKosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission Daily Report Oct. 18, 1998, The U.S. Mission to NATO:
KDOR 20/10/98 (visited Mar. 10, 1999) < http://www.nato/int/usa/ther/p981018a.htm >.

73. Sae Craig Turner, U.N. Vote Paves Way For Forte In Kosovo; Balkans: Resolation Calls for CraseFire In
Separatist Serbian Province Tecnically, Measure also provides for Military Action, L.A. Tists, Sept. 24, 1998, at
A12.
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1199 (1998) which called for an immediate cease-fire. 4 Technically, the resolution can be
interpreted to open the door for the use of military force because, while its text does not
specifically address the threatening of force or set a deadline for compliance, it was adopted
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter which permits military action to enforce compliance."
NATO interpreted this as its green light to increase its military preparedness as it repeatedly
threatened to implement air strikes against the Serbs if they did not loosen their offensive
stronghold. 6 Serbia was continually undeterred by NATO's threats. NATO then issued a final
warning and said that air strikes would commence against the Serbs if they did not withdraw their
troops and secret police within ten days." After NATO's ten day deadline was implemented, a
cease-fire agreement was negotiated between U.S. Special Envoy Richard C. Holbrooke and
Yugoslav President Slobadan Milosevic. Shortly thereafter, the Security Council adopted resolution 120378 which expressed Security Council's approval of NATO's actions."' China abstained
from the vote8" and Russia made it a point to reiterate its position that all acts of military
force needed specific Security Council approval.8" The resolution further asks both the Yugoslav
and Kosova Albanian leaders to comply fully and swiftly with the relevant U.N. Resolutions
and to cooperate fully with a verification mission in and over Kosovo."2
C. NucuAR ARMs

RAcE iN SouTH AsiA

The Security Council unanimously condemned Pakistan and India for conducting underground nuclear testing.8" Currently, only the five permanent members of the Security Council
are allowed to possess nuclear arms under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.8" Unable to
74. See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).
75. See id
76. See Greg Seigle, NATO Forces Ready to Strike Yugoslabvia, JAce's DFNcE Wio.y., Oct. 7, 1998.
77. SeeJohn M. Goshko, UN. Council Backs Kosovo Pact, Clears Way for NATO Intervention, WASH. POST,
Oct. 25, 1998, at A28.
78. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
79. Id

80. See Craig Turner, U.N. Vote Paves Way for Force in Kosovo; Balkans Resolution Calls for Case-fire in
SeparatistSerbian Province. Technically, Measure Also Providerfor Military Action, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1998, at
12. Reportedly it was difficult to get the resolution to a vote because of arguments from representatives of Russia
and China, who did not want force used. See id
81. See id After the breakup of the former Eastern bloc nations and the January 1994 Partnership for Peace,
NATO extended an invitation for the former Soviet states and nations of the Warsaw pact to join their organization.
However, Russia never joined and although it maintains a 'special relationship' with the organization, it does

not have voting power. See Transformation ofNATO's Defence Posture, (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.
nato.int/docu/facts/trans.htm >.
82. See id
83. See U.N. Sec. Council Presidential Statement, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/12 (1998); U.N. Doc.S/PRST/
1998/17 (1998). The statement, issued after Pakistan conducted tests, deplored both India and Pakistan.

The Security Council strongly deplores the underground nuclear tests that Pakistan conducted
on 28 May 1998, despite overwhelming international concern and calls for restraint. Reaffirming
the Statement of its President of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/12), on Indian nuclear tests of
11 and 13 May, the Council strongly urges India and Pakistan to refrain from any further tests.
It isof the view that testing by India and then by Pakistan is contrary to the de facto moratorium
on the testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to global efforts towards
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The Council also expresses its concern at the

effects of this development on peace and stability in the region.
See id.
84. See John Holum, Acting Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and Political-Military Affairs, Special
Briefing on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Apr. 7, 1998) (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http:www.state.gov/
www/poficy.remarks/1998/980407-_holum..sb-ctbt.html>.

SUMMER 1999

576

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

persuade the Council to take more concrete action, the United States unilaterally imposed
sanctions on the two countries.8 5 The sanctions were lifted when India and Pakistan pledged
to cooperate with the United States and implement a four point plan to "sign and ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; halt the production of fissile material; tighten export controls
on sensitive materials and technologies; and limit the development and deployment of missiles
and aircraft capable of carrying nudear weapons." 6
D.

SECURrrY CouNcIL REFORM

Recently, Japan and Germany have become increasingly vocal about their desire to become
permanent members of the Security Council. Currently, only the major powers of the World
War II era possess permanent membership on the Council and the power to veto Council
actions. The permanent members are Britain, France, China, Russia, and the United States.
Japan, in particular, has launched a campaign to amend the U.N. Charter to enable it to become
a permanent member. 7 Japan's immediate aim is to expand the number of Security Council
seats in the hopes that an increased number of seats will assist in its ultimate goal of securing
permanent membership with or without the veto."8 An amendment ofthe U.N. Charter requires
the approval of the Security Council (including the concurrence of the five permanent members)
followed by a vote of the General Assembly. 9
III. International Court of Justice
There have been major developments in at least two cases on the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) docket with respect to the justiciable questions in the Lockerbie case and the ancillary
jurisdiction of counterclaims in the Oil Platforms case. The remaining five pending cases and
the one sole case under deliberation also made strides with respect to various pre-adjudication
and post-adjudication procedural issues.
A.

QuasrIoNs OF INTERPRETATION & APPLICATION OF THE

1971

MONTREAL CONVENTION

ARISING FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT AT .mCERBIE (LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v.
UNITED KINGDOM) & (LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA V. UNITED STATES)

This case ascends from the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. In March 1992, Libya
submitted two separate applications against the United States and United Kingdom to the ICJ,
in an attempt to head off their actions to apprehend the alleged Libyan terrorist suspects. In
its submissions, Libya asserts that the only applicable treaty among the three parties is the 1971
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Convention), which permits Libya to extradite or prosecute the two alleged terrorists.
Libya asserts that it has fully complied with this treaty, while the United States and United
Kingdom have breached several provisions by refusing to provide their evidence for the Libyan
investigation and by threatening to use force to induce Libya to extradite the suspects. Libya
further argues that Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883, which require Libya to extradite
the suspects to the United States or United Kingdom for trial, exceed the power of the Security

85. A Bomb in Every Backyard?, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1998, at 17.
86. America, India & Pakistan, FoRIWGN
REPORTJANE'S INFo. GRouP LTD., Dec. 17, 1998.
87. Got. to Seek &.panion of Secunty Council Seats, DAILY YOMw (Tokyo), Dec. 28, 1998, at 2.

88. See
id.
89. See
U.N. CHARTER an. 109,
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Council under the Charter of the United Nations."° In response, the United States and United
Kingdom filed three preliminary objections asserting: (1)the court lacked jurisdiction; (2)Libya's
application was inadmissible; and (3) the Libyan claims were without merit because of the
adoption of the disputed Security Council resolutions." The court heard oral arguments on
these objections in October 1997 and ruled on them, by dear majorities, in February 1998.9'
The court held that it had the preliminary jurisdiction to decide whether the destruction
of Pan Am Flight 103 is governed by the Montreal Convention. It found that a justiciable
dispute existed under the convention's provisions relating to the prosecute-or-extradite option
(articles 1, 5, 6, and 8) and state assistance with criminal proceedings (article 11).9' The court
rejected the U.S. and U.K. argument that the convention was inapplicable because the case
concerned "a threat to international peace and security resulting from state-sponsored terrorism"
rather than a bilateral difference among nations under the Treaty.94 The court found that Libya
had complied with the ICJ jurisdiction clause of the Montreal Convention (article 14) and
since the claim was unequivocally opposed by both respondents, the court consequently had
jurisdiction to proceed on the merits.'
In their second preliminary objection, the United States and United Kingdom asserted that
Libya's application was inadmissible because Libya's claims are superceded by Security Council
Resolutions 731, 748, and 883, which require Libya to surrender the suspects notwithstanding
its option to prosecute under the Montreal Convention.' 6 According to the United States and
United Kingdom, those resolutions, in and of themselves, define the responsibilities of the
interested parties and, in seeking the court's review of them, Libya was attempting to undo
their supremacy under article 103 of the U.N. Charter.' In addition, the United States and
United Kingdom argued that the resolutions rendered the claims alleged by Libya without
object because the resolutions of the Security Council precluded the relief sought and undermined
the practicality of adjudicating the case on the merits.'" The court acknowledged that certain
events subsequent to the filing of an application may preclude it from adjudication and render
a case moot. Yet, the judges determined under article 79(1) of the Rules of Court that the
respondent's objections were "preliminary" and, therefore, the question turned on whether
the controversy was "exclusively" preliminary, or was so closely related to the merits to justify
a need to investigate it through the adjudication process."
Ultimately, the court sided with Libya with respect to the timeliness of its jurisdiction. The
judges held that they maintained jurisdiction over whether a dispute existed at the time the
90. JohnJ. Kim & Gregory Gerdes,
32 INT'L LAw. 575, 577 (1998).

Intrnationallnmtutios,InrnmaionlLegalDedopmemsin Revw 1998,

91. See Peter H. F. Bekker, In
onalDrdsion:Questiom ofInterpretationandApplicationofthe 1971 Montreal
Convetion Arising from te Aerial Inident at Lackerbie, 92 Am. J. INT'L L. 503 (1998).
92. See id
93. See id at 503.
94. Id. at 504.
95. See Questions of Interpretation & Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan ArabJamahiriya v. United States), paras. 20-21, 33-3 5 (Feb. 27, 1998) (judgment)
availabk at <http://www.ij-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/lus/iusjudgment/ilus-ijudgment-980227-frame.htm>
[hereinafter Montreal Convention Judgment].
96. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992); S.C. Res. 748,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992); S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3312th mtg. at 113, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993).
97. See Bekker, supra note 91, at 508.
98. See id. at 505.
99. See id
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applicationswerefiled and in this case the Security Council resolutions were adopted after Libya
filed its applications with the court." The court declined to resolve the case in substance at
its preliminary stage, conduding that the arguments raised by the United States and United
Kingdom raised difficulties that were not of an "exclusively preliminary character and should
thus be decided on the merits phase of the dispute. '
B.

OIL PLATFORMS (IsLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. UNITED STATES OF AMEICA)

In March 1998, the ICJ held that the counterclaims filed by the United States were admissible2
and therefore could become part of the proceedings on the merits of the Oil Patforms case.
The court ruled similarly in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punisbment of
the Crime of Genocide" on December 17, 1997. These rulings constitute the first time since
4
1952 that the ICJ has utilized its ancillary jurisdiction jurisprudence on counterclaims.'
The U.S. counterclaim requested that the court find "that in attacking vessels, laying mines
in the Gulf, and otherwise engaging in military actions in 1987 and 1988 that were dangerous
and detrimental to maritime commerce, the Islamic Republic of Iran breached its obligations
to the United States under Article X" of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights between the United States and Iran of August 15, 1955, "for which Iran must make
full reparation to the United States.'' °. The United States argued that its counterclaim was
directly connected to the subject matter of Iran's claim given the totality of the circumstances
that originally caused the United States to attack the Iranian oil platforms. Drawing on the
language of article 80 of the Rules of the Court, the United States argued that a proper
counterclaim need not relate to the same facts and legalities as the original claim. Rather, as
long as there is a direct connection between the counterclaim and the original claim, joinder
is proper. Iran reserved its right to raise preliminary objections against the counterclaim because
its position was that, under article 80(3), the issue of whether there is a direct connection and/
or jurisdiction over a counterclaim comes subsequent to a hearing exclusively examining whether
the counterclaim should initially be joined."
Finally, the ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to hear the U.S. counterclaim "in so far as
the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by article X, paragraph 1." 107
Hence, while the court agreed with Iran that its general jurisdiction over this case covered
only those claims made by Iran under article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty and under no other
100. See Montreal Convention Judgment, supra note 95, para. 37 (citing Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.)); see
aso Preliminary Objection, 195 3 l.CJ. 111, 122 (Nov. 18); Right of Passage Over India Territory (Port v. India),
Preliminary Objections, 1957 I.C.J. 125, 142 (Nov. 26).
101. Bekker, supra note 91, at 505; Montreal Convention Judgment, supra note 95, paras. 40-41. Please note

that the only other new development since the February decision was the grant of an extension from the December
30, 1998, deadline to March 31, 1999, for the United States and United Kingdom to file their counter-memorials.
102. Ser Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States) (order of Mar. 10, 1998) atailabk at <http://
www.ic-cij.org>.
103. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (BosniaHerzegovina v. Yugo.) (Order of Dec. 17, 1997) (visited Mar. 10, 1999) < http://www.ic-cij.org>.
104. See Peter Bekker, Application of the Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugo.), Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States), 92 Am. J.
Int'l L. 508 (1998) [hereinafter Bekker on Counterclaims].
105. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations & Consular Rights, Aug. IY, 1955, U.S.-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, cited
in Bekker on Counterclaims, supra note 104, at 511.
106. Bekker on Counterclaims, supra note 104, at 511.

107. See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States), (Order of Mar. 10) (slip opinion) availabk
at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
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provision, the court also found it proper to consider the U.S. position that "Iranian attacks
on shipping, the laying of mines, and other military actions" were capable of falling within
the scope of article X, paragraph 1 of the treaty which will be explored during the merits of
the case. 1°8

C. APPLICATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
(PARAGUAY V. UNrrED STATES) 1 °9

Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan citizen, was executed in the United States on April
14, 1998, for attempted rape and murder. Appeals made by both the Paraguayan government
and Mr. Breard to place a stay on the execution on the basis of certain diplomatic rights were
denied, per curiam, by the U.S. Supreme Court.11 Prior to the execution, Paraguay filed an
application against the United States with the ICJ. It alleged violations of both the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.. and the U.S.-Paraguay Treaty of Friendship.. because
the U.S. government did not inform Breard of his right to contact a Paraguayan consular
officer at the time of his arrest. Although the ICJ granted Paraguay's request for provisional
measures requesting the United States not to carry out the execution," 3 the state of Virginia
went ahead with the execution. After the United States issued an apology, Paraguay requested
that the ICJ dismiss the case.4
D.

MARITIME DELIMrrATION & TERITORIAL QUESTIONS BETWEEN QATAR & BAHRAIN
(QATAR V. BAHRAIN)

This dispute arises from the time when the British government territorially occupied Qatar,
Bahrain, and the Hawar Islands."' The only new development in 1998 was the court's requests
for the submission of additional written pleadings concerning the sovereignty of the Hawar
Islands and the delimitation of maritime areas." 6
E.

GASCIKOvo-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (HUNGARY V. SLOVtA)

Hungary had until December 7, 1998, to file a written statement with the ICJ explaining
its position and to respond to Slovakia's request for an additional judgment submitted on
September 3, 1998.2" The request came after Hungary refused to negotiate with Slovakia
pursuant to the judgment delivered by the court in September 1997, with respect to its dams
on the Danube River. ' That judgment found that both nations breached the objectives of

108. Bekker on Counterclaims, supra note 104, at 513. Iran's reply deadline extended until March 1999.
U.S. deadline to file for rejoinder extended until November 2000.
109. See Application of The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States), (Provisional
Measures Order of Apr. 9, 1998) ati/aabkat <http:www.icj-cij.org>.
110. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (denied per curiam).
Ill. SeeVienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
112. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Feb. 4, 1859, U.S.-Para., 12 Star. 1091.
113. See I.CJ. No. 98/36 (Nov. 11, 1998).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Ingrid Persuand & Richard Thrnston, Recent Deveopments at the IC], AslL NEwsL. (Interest Group
on International Organizations), Fall 1998, at 17.
117. See id. at 18.
118. See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Sept. 25, 1997) (judgment)
avaiabk at <http://www.ic-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgment/ihs-.ijudgment-.97025-frame.htm>
[hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros judgment].
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the 1977 Budapest Treaty and their legal obligations to one another.'"9 The court then ordered
them to proceed to negotiate, in good faith, the "construction and operation of the dams on
20
the Danube River and the Gabcikovoa-Nagymaros barrage system."'
F.

LAND & MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN CAMEROON & NIGERIA (CAMEROON V. NIGERIA)

On June 11, 1998, the ICJ affirmed that it had jurisdiction in this dispute between Cameroon
and Nigeria, despite the eight preliminary objections filed by Nigeria.' Hence, the court found
the case does possess several justiciable issues. It decided to refrain from ruling on one of the
eight objections, which it found was too closely related to the merits of the case, and was
22
outside the scope of the court's preliminary ruling power.
G.

DIFFERENCE RELATING TO IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS OF A SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF

THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

This recently filed case arises from the request for an advisory opinion' to evaluate the
scope of privileges and immunities that U.N. officials enjoy in their missions as representatives
of the organization, in particular under Article VI § 22 of the Convention of Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations.' The case stems from a libd claim filed against Special
Rapporteur Dato Param Cumaraswamy for alleged defamatory statements made during an
interview with a magazine that resulted in Malaysian judgments against him totaling S112
million in damages. 25 The U.N. has taken the position that Mr. Cumaraswamy has certain
speech and debate immunities related to his duty as a U.N. official, and therefore he is judgment
26
proof.
H.

FISHERIES JURISDICTION (SPAIN V. CANADA)

This is the only case currently under deliberation by the ICJ. OnJune 17, the court concluded
public hearings on the focus of this case: jurisdiction.2 7 The case arises out of a situation in
March 1995 when officials from a Canadian patrol boat boarded a Spanish fishing boat on
the high seas off the coast of Canada.' 2 Spain filed an application with the ICJ on the basis
that Canada had violated customary international law with respect to the freedom of navigation
and fishing on the high seas as well as its flagship jurisdiction.' Canada contends that the ICJ
does not have jurisdiction due to Canada's reservation to submit only to "disputes arising out
of or concerning conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to
vessels fishing in the enforcement of such measures," when it accepted the court's compulsory
jurisdiction.'

3°

119. See id.

120. Id.
121. See i.
122. Se id.
123. By ECOSOC in 1998. It should be noted that Malaysia did oppose the submission and will make its
own presentation of arguments.
124. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros judgment, supra note 118.
125.
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130.
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IV. International Law Commission
The International Law Commission (IL) is "an United Nations advisory group composed
ofjurists from around the world," that works to develop and draft codes for the law of treaties. "
In their Fiftieth Session 3 ' the ILC debated six topics. The two topics gaining the most attention
were "state responsibility" and "reservations to multilateral treaties." 1 31
A.

STATE REsPONSI5ILrTY

The allocation of state responsibility in treaties places a duty upon specific state action(s),
which individual states must meet. Last year, several draft articles were adopted and read into
the ILC's current quinquennium.' 34 In 1998, members of the ILC decided to analyze and
examine the concepts of ju coges norms and erga omns obligations and create a working
group which would remove the concept of state crimes from further consideration during the
commission's work, but to do so without taking a position on whether state crimes themselves
exist. 1' 5 State crimes, countermeasures, and dispute settlement procedures have been the most
divisive issues addressed by the ILC under state responsibility. "6
Thus, it was not surprising when it came time to make recommendations to reformulate
article 19 on state crimes that two opposing camps emerged within the ILC this session.
One side called for the entire fundamentally flawed concept of state crimes to be removed.'"
It argued "that state practice (including the case law of the International Court) does not
support the notion of crimes committed by states, and that stigmatizing entire societies as
criminal because of acts committed by their leaders is a dangerous idea."' 1 8 Moreover, it
suggested replacing article 19 with a calibrated notion of wrongfulness that could apply to
all violations of the principal rules of international law.' 3 The opposing side stressed that
for more than twenty years the ILC had proceeded on the assumption that state crimes
would be part of its final recommendations on state responsibility and that it should not
deviate from that path. Particularly, because while article 19 may need reformulation,
extreme violations of human rights (such as genocide) should not be heaped in with crimes

that are not considered mala in se."
B. RE ERvATIoNs TO MULTlATERAL TREATIES
In addition to adopting guidelines on the purpose of a reservation, when one may be formu-

lated, its territorial scope, and the territorial application of a treaty and reservations formed
131. MAmRJANis, AN INrrODUCF3ON TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 15 (1988).
132. Part I was held in Geneva from April 20 to June 12, 1998. Part H was held in New York from July
27 to August 14, 1998. The session was split this year because the Rome Conference on an International Criminal
Court also convened this summer.

133. Gregory H. Fox, Tbe 50th Sesion of the Internationa Law Commision, Asu. NEWSL. (Interest Group on
International Organizations), Fall 1998, at 17. (The other four topics were: () international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law; (ii) state succession and its impact on nationality
of natural and legal persons; (iii) diplomatic protection; and (iv) unilateral acts of States.)
134. Set Report of te IntrnationalLawo Commision on the Work of Its Fiftieth Session, U.N. GAOR Interational
Law Commission, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (1998).

135. See id.
136. See id

137. See id

138. Id
139. Id

140. Id
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jointly, the ILC adopted Special Rapporteur Alain Pellet's aggregated definition of "reservation,"
which he created by mergingthe definitions from three previous Vienna Conventions.' 41 Accordingly, the ILC determined that:
"Reservation" means a unilateral statement, however phrased or need, by a State or by an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving, or acceding
to a treaty or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty or by a State when
making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or organization purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State or that organization."'
V. International Financial Institutions
At the year's outset, few disagreed that the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) needed reform. Some suggested reconfiguring the two into a sort of super international Federal Reserve Board to support troubled currencies with trillions of dollars in assets.143
Others believe that though the World Bank and the IMF have overlapping functions, they
have different roles. Principally, the World Bank provides loans to developing nations to help
them thrive in the world economy.'44 In contrast, the IMF mainly concerns itself with countries'
fiscal policies and tries to maintain the world's currencies by ensuring that payments of credit
between countries flow.14' The IMF also lends money to its members who face serious balance
of payments deficits.'"
A. WoRD BANK
In its search for global relevance, the World Bank continues to grapple in its quest to
demonstrate it has what it takes to lead into the next millennium. In an effort to rescue itself
from obscurity, the World Bank has begun work on projects that fall in line with the prevailing
doctrine of privatization. One example is the collaborative program the World Bank has entered
into with the government ofNorway to address climate change, which encourages private-public
solutions in an effort to curb carbon monoxide emissions and decrease air pollution." 7 The
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have also begun granting extra loans
to help mobilize resources and raise awareness of the computer millennium bug."18 This comes
in response to the growing concern that emerging markets are falling too far behind in their
efforts to avoid problems in the year 2000.'

141. Id

142. Id.
143. See Philip Shenon, The Clinton Budget. Foreign Affairs, A warning about chaos from Asia, N.Y. TUMS,

Feb. 3, 1998, at 17. Congress hasbeen one of the harshest critics, with many demanding that the two institutions
be completely overhauled. However, it does have considerable clout with 14% of the vote in both institutions,
and it is the largest single contributor.
144.
Bank].
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See WorldBankHoae Page(visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http:/www-esd.worldbank.org> [hereinafter World
See
See
See
See
See

IA4F Home Page (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.imf.int>.
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World Bank, supra note 144.
World Bank Y2K Home Page (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http:/www.worldbank.org/y2k>.
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B. IMF
After enduring harsh criticisms from many quarters, the IMF has begun to shift its substantive
stance on capital flows and has continued to implement more procedural reforms. The most
explicit indicator that the IMF's views on the efficiency of capital controls has shifted comes
from its annual report on International Capital Markets. " ° In its report, the IMF concludes
from the recent financial crisis in Asia that aggressive movements of capital can revive the
economies of some countries. Yet the IMF simultaneously recognizes that opening economies
to free flows of capital too soon may be a calamity in and of itself."'
The IMF's traditional policies focused on sound money, prudent fiscal policies, and open
markets." 2 While IMF economists stridently express the need for the complete openness of
countries to foreign capital, critics contend that the Asian crisis has challenged these policies."'
As part of containing a financial crisis, the IMF warns that there are limits on which financial
sectors can be strengthened. The IMF suggests that policy makers may need to impose temporary
measures to restrain certain types of inflows, which include various prudential controls such
as attempting to increase the cost of using external debt, especially for the short term. " ' Specific
proposals include using a Chilean-style tax."' The Chilean tax system requires that those who
borrow capital from abroad deposit thirty percent of the loan for one year in the Chilean
Central Bank at a zero percent interest rate." 6 The result of such financial quarantine periods
is to discourage short-term speculative capital investors and thus minimize the risk of agitations
in the market. Finally, the IMF report highlighted problems arising from liquid cross-border
loans between banks that can be quickly withdrawn."' The ILF suggests using preventive
measures such as limits on capital assets and requirements for banks receiving the liabilities,
while also changing the capital requirements for lending banks." 8

1. Asia
Early this year there were other signals that the policies of the IMF have softened in Thailand,
South Korea, and Indonesia where the IMF set less stringent financial targets and allowed for
more time to reduce budget deficits." 9 The IMF also agreed to accept somewhat lower interest
rates than the original rescue plans prescribed, 6" and in Indonesia the IMF is allowing for the
phasing out of subsidies for food and fuel at a slower rate than initially required.' 6 ' This
development is extraordinary since subsidies are the anathema of IMF policies because they
severely distort a country's economy. The IMF, however, still demanded a reduction in Indone-

150. See World Eoomi Outlook & International Caital Markets-Interim Assessment, available at <http://
www.im f.int/external/puos/it/weo/weo 1298 >.

151. Seeid
152. See Inegrationofth Eainomirsin Transitioninto the WorldEconomy, IMF Doc. A. 53/306 (1998) [hereinafter
Integration].
153.
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FinancialTimes, IMF shifts stand on effert of capitalflows, Fmi. Posr, Sept. 22, 1998, at 18.
Integration,supra note 152, at 5.
id. at 7.
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157. See id.

158. See id

159. See Timothy Lane et al., /AF-SupportedProgramsin Indonesia, Korea &?Tbailand.A PreliminaryAssement,
Preliminary Copy, I.M.F. Jan. 1999.
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sia's "crony capitalism." 162 Among the reforms demanded are tighter regulation of the "banking
system, restructuring of the corporate debt, ending subsidies to special interest groups, and
eliminating monopolies (some ofwhich are owned by Indonesian President Suharto's family)."' 63
The IMF also adopted "a plan to keep money and credit policies stable inhopes of strengthening
the country's beleaguered currency"" 4-which fell about eighty-five percent following Indonesia's financial crisis. 6
2. Russia
Another criticism of IMF policies grows from the issue of whether countries should fix their
currencies in terms of dollars or let them drift according to the whims of the market. The
logistics work in a way in which countries adopt a fixed exchange rate for their currency and
pledge to convert their money into dollars at that rate.'66 While this often makes investors
feel safe, it can have a similar effect as the stock market crash of 1929, when waves of leery
investors all cashed in their notes at the same time. 67
Russia is a prime example of this danger. There, the government was using what are known
as Government Short-term Obligation bonds (GKOs) which are similar to a pyramid scheme
because the government issues bonds then pays them off with the proceeds from other newly
issued bonds. Russia continued this practice for about two years until it received pressure from
IMF economists to devalue its currency. 6' Initially, the IMF did not want to help because Russia
failed to meet the conditions of overhauling its economy as it had agreed to do as a condition for
two previous IMF loans. 69 Since 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the IMF has lent
Russia S18.8 billion.'7 Yet, President Clinton encouraged the IMF to make the additional loan
after Boris Yeltsin personally asked for his assistance.17' Thus, Russia received a 54.8 billion emergency loan in 1998. However, four weeks later it "reneged on promises to restructure the GKO
bonds or pay.. . foreign investors."' 72 Instead, Russia said it "froze their international debt payments," decided to "pay GKO investors pennies on the dollar," and "abandoned efforts to prop
up the ruble," which then fell into a free fall and went twenty below the dollar."'
3. Brazil
Through a disbursement loan from the Special Reserve Facility, 174 Brazil was the recipient
of a $41 billion IMF aid program inNovember 1998. The loan comes ina front-loaded package
162. Art Pine, IMF OK's $1Billion Loan Installmentfor Indonesia, L.A. TiAsn, May 5, 1998, at D3.
163. Id
164. Id
165. See
id.
166. See IMF's Response to the Asian Crisi-Fasbeet,availabk at <http//www.imf.int/cxtemal/np/exr/facts/
asia/htm>.
167. See
id.
168. See
Richard Paddok, Russia Plays Loose Witb IAF Billio Finanes CentralBank Is FaukadforSquandering
Emergency Loan, L.A. Timrs, Sept. 24, 1998, at Al.
169. See id.
170. See Lane, supra note 159, at 17.
171. See id
172. Id
173. See id

174. Se idThe distinction between Brazil and the Mexican bailout is that Brazil's loan is not secured with
collateral. While Mexico was also running out of liquid currency inthe 1995 peso crisis, Brazil still has $40
billion intheir reserves. See id.See also John J.Kim &Gregory Gerdes, InwmationalInstitutions, InternationalLegal
Developments inReview: 1998, 32 INT'L LAw. 575, 585 (1998) (describing the structure and purposes of this new

IMF facility).
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aimed at calming shaky investors and was approved with the objective of preventing the financial
crisis from spilling over into Latin America.' Brazil has been targeted as a western hemisphere
test case because it is braving the fiscal chaos that "threatens growth not only in emerging
markets but economies around the world." '7 6
VI. International Treaties
In 1998, two Conventions aimed at preserving life and preventing acts of senseless violence
stood out in the field of international treaties.
A.

LAND MINES

Use, Stockpiling,
In fall 1998, the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the
78
77
Production and Transfer ofAnti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction . went into force.
The agreement bans the manufacture, stockpiling, and use of land mines intended to kill or
maim individuals.' 7 There are at least 100 million anti-personnel mines in more than seventy
countries. 80 Civilians are at the greatest risk and at least 500 civilians are killed or injured
every week from these abandoned arms."8 ' Peace activists around the world work cooperatively
to influence their governments to become parties to the convention. While the United States
has yet to sign the convention, President Clinton stated that the United States would become
a party 8by
the year 2006, provided the Pentagon finds suitable alternatives to protect South
2
Korea.'
B.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPREiSSlON OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS

The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was conduded by the United
Nations in 1998. The convention fills a gap in the existing web of anti-terrorist conventions
by requiring states either to prosecute persons suspected of terrorist bombings or extradite
them to other nations.8 3 Similar to most anti-terrorist agreements, the convention is based on

175. See Johnathan Peterson, Brazilto Recive $41 Billion in Aid to Stave Off Cnsi, Famonsia. IMF-ed Package
Will C bat Possibil f FinancialMekdom. Deal Incuda $5 Billion From US., L.A. Tiase, Nov. 14, 1998,
at Al.
176. Se id
177. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production & Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines &on their Destruction, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997) [hereinafter Convention on Anti-personnel Mines]. ("The
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on
May 3, 1996, and annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, appears at 35
I.L.M. 1206 (1996); The Final Act of the U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
and the Convention, done at Geneva on October 10, 1980, appears at 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980).")
178. SeeCity Edition, Treaty on LandMinesNow IntenationalLaw,IasH TIMs, Sept. 18,1998, at 4[hereinafter
Treaty on Land Mines].
179. See Convention on Anti-personnd Mines, supra note 177.
180. See Treaty on Land Mine, supra note 178.
181. Said
182. See Land Mine Ban; Clinton Sets A Date to Sign, STAR Tm. (Minneapolis, Mn.), June 5, 1998, at 20A
C. the Defense Department has argued that anti-tank land mines are needed on the Korean peninsula to deter
an invasion from the north. The problem for the United States is that the Pentagon design mixes the two mine
types to keep enemies from defusing the anti-tank weapons.").
183. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 9, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 249,
U.N. Doc. A/52/653 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention].
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the principle of aut dedre autjudicare and deals with the following offenses: the unlawful and
intentional delivery, placement, discharge, or detonation of an explosive or other lethal device
in, into, or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation
system, or an infrastructure facility, where such act is committed (a) with the intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury or (b) with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a
place, facility, or system, where such destruction results in or islikely to result in major economic
loss. Attempt and complicity also constitute offenses under the convention 84 and it excludes
bombings undertaken by traditional military forces, which are already governed by the laws
of war.'

184. See Virginia Morris & M.-Christiane Bourloyannis Vraiias, Curren Deelopmmt: The Work of The Sixtb
Committee at T7e Fiy-sewnd Session Of The UN. General Assembly, 92 Am. J. I.r'L L. 568, 574, 575 (1998).
185. See Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 183, art. 19, para. 2.
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